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TO DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE: THE
DILEMMA OF HOMEOWNERS AND REAL
ESTATE BROKERS UNDER WISCONSIN'S
"MEGAN'S LAW"
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you and your family have just purchased the home of
your dreams in a quiet suburban neighborhood. Now imagine that on a
warm summer day, your seven-year-old daughter is walking home from
school.' As she is about to enter her yard, a neighbor from across the
street, approaches her and invites her to come over and play with his
new puppy.2 Your unsuspecting child excitedly agrees, hoping to meet a
new four-legged friend. After following the neighbor inside, the neigh-
bor grabs your daughter and forces her to the floor. Before your daugh-
ter can scream for help, the neighbor strangles her with a belt, and then
proceeds to rape her while she lays unconscious? After stealing the last
breath of innocence from your daughter's seven-year-old body, the
neighbor discards her body in a nearby dumpster.
Soon after learning of your daughter's horrible death, you, for the
first time, are informed that the murderer of your child is a repeat sex
offender who has twice been incarcerated for the sexual assault of other
young children.4 Furthermore, you discover that both the seller and the
real estate broker who sold you your home knew of this information,
but failed to disclose it to you; if only you would have known this in-
formation, your daughter still may be alive.
Unfortunately, insufferable incidents such as this are not confined to
our imagination. Recent studies indicate that an estimated 61% of rape
victims are younger than eighteen-years old, while 29% are less than the
age of eleven.6 Furthermore, an alarming number of these crimes are
1. See Ralph Siegel, Suspect Admits Killing Girl, RECORD (Northern, NJ.), Aug 2,
1994, at A-1, available in 1994 WL 7768092.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. For purposes of this Comment, "real estate broker" and "broker" will mean any per-
son who is licensed to practice real estate, as defined in WIs. STAT. ANN. § 452.01(2) (1995-
96).
6. Community Notification Laws: Hearing on HR 2137 Before the Subcomm. on Crime
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1161
being committed by previous sex offenders within a few years of being
released from prison.'
In response to the strong public outcry over the release of convicted
sex offenders into our communities, on May 17, 1996 President Clinton
signed federal legislation into law that requires state law enforcement
agencies to notify and provide certain information to communities when
convicted sex offenders move into local communities s This legislation,
referred to as "Megan's Law," was named in memory of seven-year-old
Megan Kanka, who was brutally raped and murdered by a convicted sex
offender living in her neighborhood unbeknownst to Megan's parents
and other neighborhood residents.9 Since Megan's death, thirty-eight
states, including Wisconsin,"0 have enacted community notification re-
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (testimony of Ernest E. Allen,
President/CEO, National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) available in 1996 WL
166761; see also PATRICK A. LANGAN AND CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CHILD RAPE VICTIMS, 1992, at 1-2 (1994) (reporting that 51% of female rape vic-
tims are under the age of eighteen, while 16% of female rape victims are under twelve-years-
old).
7. ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 6, tbl. 9 (1989) (indicating that 7.7% of convicted rapists
were re-arrested within three years after being released from prison).
8. Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-105, 110 Stat. 1345 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. § 13701 note & 14071(d) (1996)).
9. See Siegel, supra note 1, at A-1.
10. As of July 1, 1997, 39 states have enacted community notification laws: ALA. CODE.
§§ 15-20-20 to -24 (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.086 (Michie 1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3825 (West 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290-290.4 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (West Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-102(a) to (r)
(West Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.606
(West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE 3H 9-340(11)(f)
(Supp. 1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 152/101 to 152/130 (West 1997); IND. CODE
ANN. § 5-2-12-113 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.13.3 (West 1997); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22-4909 and 45-221 (a)(29)(C) (Supp. 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:546 (West
Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 612 (WEST 1997), tit. 34-A § 11003 (West Supp.
1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792 (1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052 (Subd. 4) (1997);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-17 (Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-2 -507, -508 (1997);
N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2c:7-1 to -11 (West 1997); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.10 (Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15.10
(Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.11 (Anderson 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit.
57, § 584.E (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.586-87 (1995); 42 Pa. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9798 (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1-11 to -14 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 22-22-33 to -34 (Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-106(c) (Supp. 1997); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (Sec. 5) (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5
(13)(a)(ii), (17) (Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 4.24.550, 9A.44.130, .140, 10.01.200,70.48.470,72.09.330 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 61-
8F-5 (Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. § 301.46(2m) (1995-96); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-303 (1997).
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quirements despite ongoing legal challenges."
Although each state's law differs to some degree, they share the
common concern that released sex offenders pose a substantial danger
to the public. In support of this premise, proponents cite statistics
showing the high rate of recidivism among sex offenders 12 and the lack
of success that our criminal justice system has had in rehabilitating
them.13
As a result of this perceived safety risk, the presence of a known sex
offender living in a community will likely have a significant impact on
the residential real estate market within the surrounding area. If in-
formed that a sex offender lives within a particular area, prospective
homebuyers will presumably look elsewhere, causing area real estate
values to decline. Knowing this, sellers and real estate brokers may
have a natural tendency to keep this information confidential. How-
ever, both sellers and real estate brokers are required to disclose all ma-
terial adverse facts to prospective purchasers.'4 Such facts include all
conditions which significantly reduce the property's value or structural
integrity, or pose a health risk to the occupants of the property."5 Be-
cause Wisconsin's sex offender registration and community notification
requirements (hereinafter Wisconsin's Law) do not speak to the disclo-
sure duties of sellers and real estate brokers, the real estate industry has
been left with unanswered questions about whether sellers and real es-
tate brokers have a duty to disclose the presence of known sex offend-
ers to prospective homebuyers.
To analyze this question, Part II examines the expansion of disclo-
sure duties owed by both sellers and brokers to prospective buyers in
residential real estate transactions. Specifically, this Part surveys the
transformation from the common law doctrine of caveat emptor to the
current trend of consumer protectionism. In addition, Part II discusses
11. See W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that community notifi-
cation requirements did not impose "punishment" within the meaning of due process or ex
post facto clauses); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (NJ. 1995) (holding that registration and
community notification requirements were rationally related to legitimate state interest of
protecting public from risk from recidivist offenders and, thus, did not violate offender's
equal protection rights). But see Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that community notification provisions constituted ex post facto punishment).
12. Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-105, 110 Stat. 1345 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 13701 note & 14071(d) (1996)).
13. See 139 CONG. REC. S15295, S15310 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1993) (congressional hearings
relating to the Jacob Wetterling Act).
14. See WIS. STAT. §§ 452.133(1)(c), 709.03 (1995-96).
15. See id. §§ 452.01(le), (5g), 709.03.
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the nature of material adverse facts and how they have been defined by
our courts and state legislature. Part III analyzes the registration and
community notification requirements of Wisconsin's Law. Part IV out-
lines what a homebuyer would have to prove in order to bring a cause
of action against a seller or real estate broker for failing to disclose the
presence of a known sex offender. Part V addresses the public policy
reasons both for and against requiring a seller and a real estate broker
to disclose the existence of known sex offenders. Finally, Part VI rec-
ommends a practical solution that balances the interests of both pro-
spective homebuyers and sellers and real estate brokers.
II. A SURVEY OF THE EXPANDING DUTY To DISCLOSE IN
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
Due to the advent of consumer protectionism, many state courts and
statutes have expanded the disclosure duties owed to a prospective
homebuyer in a residential real estate transaction. Although the pur-
chase of a home is often the biggest financial and emotional investment
in a person's life, most homebuyers generally are inexperienced in pro-
cedural matters relating to financing and transferring real estate. As a
result of this inexperience, the homebuyer often relies on the experi-
ence and representations made by sellers and their real estate agents.
Because sellers and their agents generally are in a better position to
know the conditions which affect their property, courts increasingly
have attempted to protect prospective homebuyers by requiring sellers
and their agents to disclose information that may materially affect a
homebuyer's decision to purchase the property.6
A. A Seller's Common Law Duty to Disclose
1. Judicial Treatment
Historically, a seller of real estate generally had no duty to disclose
defective conditions to potential buyers." In large part, this rule was
based on the old tort notion that people generally had no duty to act.'8
16. See Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17,42,288 N.W.2d 95, 107 (1980).
17. See Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Disclosure Legislation, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 381, 385 (1995) (noting that a seller, however, could be held liable in situa-
tions where the seller expressly warranted the condition of the property, where the buyer
was not given an opportunity to inspect the property, or where the seller was guilty of fraud).
18. Ronald Basso, Note, Reed v. King: Fraudulent Nondisclosure of a Multiple Murder
in a Real Estate Transaction, 45 U. PTT. L. REv. 877, 878 (1984); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 106, at 737 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed.
1164 [Vol. 81:1161
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Thus, because there was no duty to act, a mere nondisclosure of a mate-
rial fact, no matter how unjust, was not actionable. 9 As stated by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., Inc.,2 "[a]
seller of real estate, dealing at arm's length with the buyer, has no duty
to disclose information to the buyer and therefore has no liability ...
for failure to disclose. '21 Under this common law doctrine of caveat
emptor, " or buyer beware, buyers of real estate were required to con-
duct their own investigations to determine if a property suffered from
any material defects. Most defects, however, were not easily detectable
through a buyer's inspection, especially if that buyer was not trained to
know what to look for. If buyers wanted to protect themselves from
any latent defects, they were required to negotiate an express warranty
with the seller.2 Without an express warranty, buyers were solely re-
sponsible for any defective conditions discovered relating to the prop-
erty.24 Despite these harsh results, courts consistently placed the burden
of investigating and discovering a property's condition solely on the
buyer.
Although the general rule provided that sellers were not required to
disclose any information, the common law, however, recognized certain
exceptions2 For example, if a seller chose to provide information to a
prospective buyer, the seller was required to provide enough informa-
tion to prevent the buyer from being mislead or tricked into purchasing
the real estate2 In applying this-rule, buyers, who had been given spe-
cific information from the seller, had a right to rely upon the truth of
that information without conducting an investigation.' Additionally, if a
seller made a statement and subsequently acquired additional informa-
tion which made the statement untrue or misleading, the seller had a
1984).
19. See Basso, supra note 18, at 879.
20. Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., Inc., 94 Wis. 2d 17,288 N.W.2d 95 (1980).
21. Id at 29, 288 N.W.2d at 101 (citing Kamuchey v. Trzesniewski, 8 Wis. 2d 94, 99, 98
N.W.2d 403, 405 (1959); Southard v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 31 Wis. 2d 351, 142 N.W.2d 844
(1966); Guyer v. Cites Serv. Oil Co., 440 F. Supp. 630,632 (E.D. Wis. 1977)).
22. See generally Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE
L. 1133 (1931); Leo Bearman, Jr., Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon
the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961).
23. Basso, supra note 18, at 879.
24. I
25. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 18, § 106, at 738-39.
26. Id at 737-38.
27. See Beavers v. Lamplighters Realty, Inc., 556 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that "a prospective buyer has a right to rely on the veracity of the seller (or his
agent) without investigation").
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duty to disclose the new information to anyone who was still relying on
the original statement.2 While courts also recognized a duty to disclose
where parties had a confidential or fiduciary relationship,' they rarely
considered the relationship between buyers and sellers in most residen-
tial real estate transactions to be of this nature.' Due to their relatively
limited application, these exceptions had very little effect on sellers of
real estate.3'
During the last forty years, however, most jurisdictions, including
Wisconsin, have slowly abolished the rule of caveat emptor, recognizing
that it is more equitable to provide buyers with some remedy in the
event of fraudulent misrepresentations or nondisclosures by sellers.3
While the rule of caveat emptor generally embraced the concepts of
rugged individualism and the free market,33 society no longer considered
buyers and sellers to be on equal terms or to possess comparable
knowledge and experience in the transaction.' In response to this defi-
ciency, for example, Wisconsin courts began to impose a duty to dis-
close in situations involving dangerous conditions. Such a duty arose in
situations which posed health and safety risks to the buyer35 and where
known legal encroachments were not present on legal records such as
building code36 and zoning ordinance violations,3 and unrecorded ease-
28. KEETON ET AL, supra note 18, § 106, at 738.
29. Id at 738.
30. Richard M. Jones, Comment, Risk Allocation and the Sale of Defective Used Hous-
ing in Ohio-Should Silence Be Golden?, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 215,219 (1991).
31. Iad
32. See Sarah Waldstein, Comment, A Toxic Nightmare On Elm Street Negligence and
the Real Estate Broker's Duty in Selling Previously Contaminated Residential Property, 15
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547,548-49 (1988).
33. See Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17,29,288 N.W.2d 95,101 (1980).
34. Id.
35. Rusch v. Wald, 202 Wis. 462,232 N.W. 875 (1930).
36. Brunke v. Pharo, 3 Wis. 2d 628, 89 N.W.2d 221 (1958). In Brunke, a seller conveyed
an apartment building to a buyer. I. The deed contained a covenant which warranted that
the apartment building was "free and clear from all encumbrances whatever." Id. However,
after purchasing the building, the buyer discovered that the apartment building was in viola-
tion of six building code requirements and that the seller was aware of these violations at the
time of the conveyance. Id. Because the buyer was required by law to make the necessary
changes to the building to ensure compliance with the building code, the supreme court de-
termined that building code violations constituted encumbrances. Id. at 629, 89 N.W.2d at
222. As a result, the court held that the seller was in breach of the covenant. Id. at 631. 89
N.W.2d at 223.
37. Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 Wis. 2d 175, 368 N.W.2d 676 (1985). In Lundin, a buyer
purchased a four-bedroom house from the seller who claimed, among other things, that the
upper-unit could continue to be rented out to five unrelated tenants. I. at 179, 368 N.W.2d
at 678. However, the property's zoning classification limited the occupancy to no more than
1166 [Vol. 81:1161
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ments that are not open and notorious."
Realizing that sellers are in a better position to know about their
own property and those conditions which affect its value, Wisconsin
courts have recently adopted the philosophy that sellers must disclose
"whenever justice, equity and fair dealing demand it."39 Under this
standard, sellers must disclose all known material facts relating to the
property which a prospective purchaser would not be able to readily
discover," As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals declared, in Green
Springs Farms v. Spring Green Farms Assoc.,41 "[t]he doctrine of caveat
emptor no longer excuses real estate sellers from fully disclosing to po-
tential purchasers the existence of conditions which may be material to
the decision to purchase and which the purchaser is in a poor position to
discover." 42
2. Statutory Requirements
In 1991, the Wisconsin legislature essentially codified the common
law requirement that sellers disclose all information material to the
physical condition of the property by enacting Chapter 709 of the Wis-
consin Statutes.43 This statute requires sellers" to furnish prospective
one family, plus one unrelated person. Id. at 180, 368 N.W.2d at 679. Because the seller
knew that the tenants were living upstairs in violation of the zoning code and failed to inform
the buyer of this violation, the supreme court held that there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port the jury's finding of misrepresentation. Id. at 185,368 N.W.2d at 681.
3X See Bump v. Dahl, 26 Wis. 2d 607, 612,133 N.W.2d 295,298 (1965).
39. Ollerman, 94 Wis. 2d at 34, 288 N.W.2d at 103 (citing Note, Silence as Fraudulent
Concealment-Vendor & Purchaser-Duty to Disclose, 36 WASH. L. REV. 202, 204 (1961)).
However, a seller's duty to disclose is not unlimited. For example, a seller is not required to
disclose the legal effect of a conveyance. See Ritchie v. Clappier, 109 Wis. 2d 399, 403-04,
326 N.W.2d 133-34 (Ct. App. 1982).
40. Ollerman, 94 Wis. 2d at 42,288 N.W.2d at 106. In determining whether to impose a
duty on a seller of real estate to disclose known facts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
listed the following elements as significant:
[T]he condition is 'latent' and not readily observable by the purchaser; the pur-
chaser acts upon the reasonable assumption that the condition does (or does not)
exist; the [seller] has special knowledge or means of knowledge not available to the
purchaser; and the existence of the condition is material to the transaction, that is, it
influences whether the transaction is concluded at all or at the same price."
L at 39-40; 288 N.W.2d at 106; Kanack v. Kremski, 96 Wis. 2d 426,433, 291 N.W.2d 864, 867
(1980).
41. 172 Wis. 2d 28,492 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1992).
42. Id. at 39,492 N.W.2d at 397.
43. See Wis. STAT. § 709.03 (1995-96).
44. Wisconsin Statute Chapter 709 applies to all persons transferring one to four dwell-
ing units except: personal representatives, trustees, conservators, and fiduciaries appointed
by or subject to supervision by a court. See id § 709.01. However, if any of the listed excep-
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homebuyers with a copy of a completed Real Estate Condition Report
(RECR) within 10 days after a binding sales contract has been formed.
Because many defects are only evident during particular seasonse or
under specific conditions,47 a seller's knowledge and experience is often
the most valuable source of information relating to the property's con-
dition.4 To help prospective homebuyers make informed decisions as
to the property's condition, the RECR requires sellers to indicate
whether they have notice or knowledge of twenty-seven49 enumerated
defects relating to such things as the roof, electrical system, plumbing
system, hazardous or toxic substances, special assessments, proposed
construction, and other defects ? which affect the property.51 However,
if a seller fails to disclose a known defect, the only buyer remedy spe-
cifically created by this statutory enactment is the right to rescind."
B. A Broker's Duty to Disclose to Prospective Homebuyers
Like sellers, real estate brokers traditionally owed no duties to pro-
spective homebuyers.53 This rule was based on the theory that since the
tions have ever occupied the property (even, for example, 25 years ago), they are no longer
exempt. Id
45. WIs. STAT. §§ 709.02 - .03 (1995-96). Real estate condition reports are not required
for: (1) transfers from "personal representatives, trustees and conservators; and fiduciaries
appointed or subject to supervision by a court; but only if those persons have never occupied
the property"; (2) "real estate that has not been inhabited, such as new construction or prop-
erty converted from a commercial to residential use"; and (3) "transfers exempt from the
real estate transfer fee, such as gifts between husband and wife or between parent and child,
tax sales, foreclosure sales, condemnations, and transfers by will, descent or survivorship."
See Debra Peterson Conrad, Truth or Consequences? Residential Seller Disclosure Law, 65
WIS. LAW. 9, 10 (Aug. 1992), citing WIS. STAT. §§ 77.25 & 709.01 (1992).
46. For example, a defective air conditioner may not be detected during the winter
months. See Conrad, supra note 45, at 10.
47. For example, a basement may leak only after a heavy rainstorm. Id.
48. Id.
49. In addition to the 27 stated defects directly relating to the condition of the property,
the RECR also requires the seller to disclose whether the property is an historic building or
is located in an historical district. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 709.03 (D)(1) (1995-96).
50. A "defect" is defined as a condition that would (1) have a significant adverse effect
on the property's value, (2) significantly impair the health or safety of future occupants of
the property, or (3) significantly shorten or adversely affect the expected normal life of the
premises if not repaired, removed, or replaced. See id. § 709.03(B)(1).
51. See id. § 709.03.
52. ld. § 709.05.
53. Due to the principal-agent relationship between the seller and the broker, the bro-
ker has a duty to act in good faith and for the sole benefit of the seller. See Sheldon Wini-
cour, Clearing the Air on Radon Testing: The Duty of Real Estate Brokers to Protect Prospec-
tive Homebuyers, 15 FORDHAM URB. Li. 767,777 (1987); see also HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN
& WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 68 (2d ed. 1990).
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broker was an agent of the seller, and the seller owed no duty to buyers
under the doctrine of caveat emptor, the broker, who stood in the place
of the seller, maintained a similar relationship to the buyer.'
In recent years, however, Wisconsin courts have recognized the im-
portant role which brokers play in modem residential real estate trans-
actions. As a result, courts have expanded the disclosure duties owed
by brokers to prospective purchasers under three doctrines: public in-
terest theory, tort liability, and statutory and administrative require-
ments.55
1. Agency Law v. Duty to the Public
In most residential real estate transactions, a seller and a broker
create an agency relationship56 by entering into a listing agreement.'
The listing agreement is a contract between the buyer and seller which
sets forth, among other things, the property to be sold, the terms and
conditions of the listing, and the duties of both the seller and the bro-
ker.5 ' As an agent of the seller, the broker owes the seller a duty of un-
divided loyalty, good faith, and full disclosure of all material informa-
tion relating to the transaction. Furthermore, since the broker
generally receives a commission based upon a percentage of the sales
price, both the broker and the seller have a mutual interest in obtaining
the highest sales price possible in the shortest amount of time.6
54. See Paul A. Longton, Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker.Buyer-
Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1972).
55. See Paula C. Murray, The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer: Negligence and the
Duty to Investigate, 32 VILL. L. REV. 939, 957-84 (1987); see generally Joseph M. Groham, A
Reassessment of the Selling Real Estate Broker's Agency Relationship with the Purchaser, 61
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 560 (1987) (arguing that a subagency relationship between the seller and
the selling broker created solely on the basis of a broker's membership in the multiple listing
services is contrary to both the laws of agency and the expectations of the buyer).
56. "The essential and basic feature underlying the relation of a broker to his employer
is that of agency, and the principles of the law of agency apply throughout." Hercules v.
Robedeaux, Inc., 110 Wis. 2d 369,373,329 N.W.2d 240 (1982) (citing Ford v. Wisconsin Real
Estate Examining Bd., 48 Wis. 2d 91,102,179 N.W.2d 786,792 (1970)).
57. See William J. Minnick III & Marlynn Parada, Comment, The Real Estate Broker's
Fiduciary Duties: An Examination of Current Industry Standards and Practices, 12 PEPP. L.
REV. 145, 150-51 (1984); Molly Moore Romero, Note, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liabil-
ity: Arizona's Merging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 767, 769-71 (1978); Longton,
supra note 54, at 1356.
58. See generally WALTER B. RAUSHENBUSH & ScOTT C. MINTER, WISCONSIN REAL
ESTATE LAW §§ 3.02 & 3.03 (1994) (providing a detailed discussion of the requirements for
a listing contract under Wisconsin law).
59. See Montoya v. McLeod, 221 Cal. Rptr. 353,358 (Ct. App. 1985).
60. See Vivian Arnold Realty Co. v. McCormick, 506 P.2d 1074,1078-79 (Ariz. Ct. App.
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Due to the agency relationship between the seller and broker, courts
traditionally maintained that the broker owed no fiduciary duties to the
prospective homebuyer.1 Courts based this rationale on the belief that
a broker who was legally responsible to both parties would be faced
with a natural conflict of interest: the seller wants to receive the highest
possible price while buyers want to pay the lowest possible price. 2 In
resolving this conflict, courts applied the general principle that an agent
cannot serve two masters' and refused to extend broker liability to
buyers based on nondisclosure.'
Recently, however, courts have recognized the significant role in
which real estate brokers play in residential real estate transactions and,
thus, have held brokers liable to buyers for breach of a fiduciary duty
despite the lack of a traditional agency relationship.6 For most people,
the purchase of a home is often the largest emotional and financial in-
vestment in their lifetime. Brokers and buyers, therefore, are often en-
gaged in a close working relationship,66 causing the buyer to place a
great deal of trust in the broker. 7 Additionally, many prospective buy-
ers are inexperienced with the contractual and financial procedures re-
quired in the purchase of real estate. If they are not represented by an
attorney, buyers often rely solely on the advice of real estate brokers
due to the broker's superior knowledge and experience in such transac-
tions." As a result of this relationship, courts have required brokers to
deal fairly and competently with prospective buyers.69
Courts also have imposed a fiduciary duty on brokers based on the
1973).
61. Norville v. Palant, 545 P.2d 454 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Allen v. Lindstrom, 379
S.E.2d 450 (Va. 1989). A broker, however, may owe fiduciary duties to a buyer if the broker
is serving as the buyer's agent.
62. See Romero, supra note 57, at 770-71.
63. See REUSCHLEIN, supra note 53, at § 68, at 127.
64. See Zichlin v. Dill, 25 So.2d 4, 4 (Fla. 1946) (noting that an agent is generally re-
sponsible only to his or her principal).
65. See Waldstein, supra note 32, at 554.
66. During the course of a transaction, a broker will often spend a considerable amount
of time with the prospective homebuyer, offering advice and discussing the buyer's personal
financial information and personal preferences while searching for the perfect house. See
Romero, supra note 57, at 772 n.32; see also Waldstein, supra note 32, at 554.
67. To ensure that buyers are made fully aware of the agency relationship that exists
between the broker and the seller, Wisconsin has enacted mandatory disclosure require-
ments which require the brokers to disclose to both parties the duties owed to each party. See
Wis. STAT. § 452.135 (1995-96).
68. Waldstein, supra note 32, at 554.
69. Id. at 555.
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state licensing laws. Because most residential real estate transactions
involve brokers,70 the public has a general interest in requiring brokers
to have a minimum level of competency and, thus, require brokers to
satisfy various educational requirements before becoming licensed to
practice71 By requiring all brokers to become licensed by the state,
Wisconsin has given brokers a special status among the public with
whom they work.73 Due to the benefits gained by such status, Wisconsin
courts have imposed a duty upon brokers to deal with prospective buy-
ers in an honest, fair, and ethical manner 4 As recognized by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court:
The purpose and method of licensing real estate brokers to do
business and limiting this field to those so duly licensed creates a
relation between the broker and the public dealing with him
which places on him an obligation commensurate with the ad-
vantage he has in the general knowledge that he is designated as
one having special understanding and information concerning
the things affecting his particular vocation.
2. Liability in Tort
To prevent fraudulent misrepresentations and nondisclosures by
real estate brokers, Wisconsin courts have held that brokers may be li-
able to buyers for three types of tortious misrepresentations: inten-
tional, negligent, and strict responsibility
A broker who actively misstates information to conceal material de-
fects in a property may be held liable for intentional7 misrepresenta-
70. NATIONAL ASS'N OF REALTORS, TARGETING PROSPECTIVE HOME BUYERS AND
SELLERS 43 (figure 5.1) (1995 Ed.) (indicating that 81% of all homeowners employed the
services of real estate brokers to assist them in selling their homes).
71. See generally Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ RL 25.02, .03 (1996) (discussing the general
education requirements for obtaining a broker's license).
72. WIS. STAT. § 452.03 (1995-96).
73. See id.; see also WIS. ADMIN. CODE §§ RL 25.02, .03 (1996).
74. Hercules v. Robedeaux, 110 Wis. 2d 369, 373, 329 N.W.2d 240, 242 (1982); see also
WIs. STAT. § 452.133 (1)(a) (1995-96).
75. Rusch v. Wald, 202 Wis. 462,463-64,232 N.W. 875, 876-77 (1930).
76. See Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 168 N.W.2d 201 (1969). In Whipp, a buyer
and seller entered into an agreement for the sale of an automobile dealership. I&i at 167, 168
N.W.2d at 202. After the sale, the Oldsmobile division of General Motors refused to transfer
the franchise to the buyer. Id. at 168, 168 N.W.2d at 202. Because the seller, as owner of the
franchise, knew or should of known that the franchise could not be sold as part of the busi-
ness, the supreme court held that the seller was liable for misrepresentation on the theory of
strict liability. Id. at 172, 168 N.W.2d at 204. As demonstrated in Whipp, courts may gener-
ally find sellers liable under the same theories as brokers for misrepresentation.
77. To maintain a successful claim of misrepresentation against a broker, a buyer must
1998] 1171
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tion.7 Such a liability may be created if the broker knows the represen-
tation is untrue or if it was made recklessly without first determining its
truth.79 In Grube v. Daun," the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that
"once [a broker] has made an affirmative representation about some
aspect of the property, the buyer is entitled to rely upon that statement
and expect full and fair disclosure of all material facts relating to that
aspect of the property.""1
Wisconsin, unlike some jurisdictions, also holds a broker liable for
making negligent misrepresentations.2 By imposing liability on brokers
for negligent misrepresentations, buyers are relieved of the difficult
evidentiary burden of showing that the broker made the statement with
an intent to deceive or that the broker knew the disclosed information
was false." Although a broker may believe that the representation is
true, the broker likely will be held negligent if the broker failed to use
"reasonable care in ascertaining the facts, or in the manner of expres-
sion, or [if the broker fails to use] the skill and competence required
by... [the] profession.""
In addition to imposing liability under the theories of intentional
and negligent misrepresentation, a court may hold a broker strictly re-
sponsible for a misrepresentation. Under the theory of strict responsi-
bility, a broker who makes an incorrect statement of fact, even though
his belief as to its truth was reasonable, may be held liable if he made
the statement based on (1) his own personal knowledge or (2) under
circumstances which indicate that he ought to have known the truth of
the statement.85 Because a license to sell real estate connotes a degree
show that: (1) the broker made a representation of fact; (2) such representation of fact was
untrue; (3) the broker made the representation knowing that the fact was untrue or made it
recklessly without caring whether it was true or false; (4) the broker made the representation
with an intent to defraud and to induce the buyer to act upon it; and (5) the buyer believed
such representation to be true and relied on it to the buyer's detriment. Grube v. Daun, 173
Wis. 2d 30,53 - 54,496 N.W.2d 106, 114-15 (Ct. App. 1992).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
79. Whipp, 43 Wis. 2d at 169-70, 168 N.W.2d at 203.
80. 173 Wis. 2d 30,496 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1992).
81. Id at 61,496 N.W.2d at 117.
82. In a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a buyer must show that: (1) the broker
made a factual representation; (2) the representation was untrue; (3) the broker was negli-
gent in making the representation; and (4) the buyer believed the representation to be true
and relied on it to the buyer's detriment. Id. at 53-55,496 N.W.2d at 114-15.
83. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 18, § 107, at 740-41.
84. Id at 745.
85. See Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 169-70, 168 N.W.2d 201,203 (1969). In addi-
tion, the broker must also have a pecuniary interest in the transaction. Id at 170, 168
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of competence to the general public, the doctrine of strict responsibility
is based on a public policy which favors placing liability upon the inno-
cent broker rather than the innocent buyer who has been misled.'
Based on this rationale, Wisconsin courts frequently have imposed li-
ability upon brokers who have unintentionally misrepresented such
things as the allowable uses under the present zoning classification,
amount of water frontage," and the size of the lot.89
In addition, a broker may be liable under all three doctrines for
failing to disclose a fact."° If a broker has a duty to disclose a particular
fact, the broker's "failure to disclose that fact is treated.., as the
equivalent to a representation [that the fact does not exist]." '91
3. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements
In recent years, Wisconsin has enacted various statutory and regula-
tory requirements which have expanded and further defined the duties
owed by a real estate broker to prospective homebuyers. To help
eliminate the apparent conflicts in the duties owed to both the seller
and the public with whom the broker deals,' the Wisconsin legislature,
in 1993, set forth seven duties a broker owes to all parties in a transac-
tion.93 Among these duties is the requirement that brokers disclose all
material adverse facts that are both (1) known to the broker and (2)
unknown to or unable to be discovered through a reasonable vigilant
observation by the buyer.94
Under the vigilant observation doctrine, a broker, absent an agency
relationship between the broker and buyer," is required to disclose only
N.W.2d at 203. Wisconsin courts also have a long history of applying the doctrine of strict
responsibility to representations made by sellers. See, e.g., Harweger v. Wilcox, 16 Wis. 2d
526, 114 N.W.2d 818 (1962); Lee v. Bielefeld, 176 Wis. 225, 186 N.W. 587 (1922); Davis v.
Nuzum, 72 Wis. 439,40 N.W. 497 (1888).
86. See Gaurke v. Rozga, 112 Wis. 2d 271, 282, 332 N.W.2d 804, 809-10 (1983) (citing
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 107, at 712 (4th ed. 1971)).
87. Rusch v. Wald, 202 Wis. 462,232 N.W. 875 (1930).
88. Gaurke v. Rozga, 112 Wis. 2d 271, 332 N.W.2d 804 (1983).
89. Reda v. Sincaban, 145 Wis. 2d 266,426 N.W.2d 100 (1988).
90. See Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30,55-56,496 N.W.2d 106,115 (Ct. App. 1992).
91. Id. (citing Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 26, 288 N.W.2d 95, 99-100
(1980)).
92. See Wrede H. Smith, Jr. & Richard J. Staff, The New Real Estate Agency Law: Rede-
fining the Role of Real Estate Brokers, 67 Wis. Law 9,10 (Oct. 1994).
93. Wis. STAT. § 452.133(1) (1995-96).
94. Md § 452.133(1)(c).
95. If a broker is acting as a buyer's agent, the broker, among other things, has a duty to
disclose all known information, as opposed to only adverse information, that is material to
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those material adverse facts that the buyer does not know or cannot
easily discover."6 In Kanack v. Kremski,9' a buyer brought suit against a
seller for failing to disclose "a serious water problem in the basement."98
In denying the buyer's claim, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that
buyers of real estate have a duty to exercise proper vigilance by either
personally inspecting the property or inquiring about its condition."
Buyers, therefore, must "not close their eyes to means of information
accessible to them."'' I
In Wisconsin, a broker's disclosure duties are not limited to only
those material adverse facts which affect the condition of the property.
Rather, a broker generally must disclose any information that suggests
the possibility of adverse facts which are material to the transaction.0'
Such facts are likely to include any on-site or off-site conditions which
materially affect the habitability, use, enjoyment, or value of the prop-
erty.' 02 To determine if there are any material adverse facts, a broker is
required to conduct "a reasonably competent and diligent inspection"
of the house and areas immediately surrounding the property.'O If such
facts are discovered, the broker must disclose these facts, in writing, to
each party in the transaction. 'O A broker, however, is not required to
retain third-party inspectors to further investigate possible material ad-
the transaction and not known by the buyer. See id § 452.133(2)(b).
96. See Farr v. Peterson, 91 Wis. 182, 187-88, 64 N.W. 863, 865 (1895); Kanack v. Krem-
ski, 96 Wis. 2d 426,434-35, 291 N.W.2d 863, 868 (1980).
97. 96 Wis. 2d 426,291 N.W.2d 864 (1980).
98. Ia at 428,294 N.W.2d at 865.
99. See i.d at 435,294 N.W.2d at 868.
100. d at 432, 294 N.W.2d at 867 (quoting Farr v. Peterson, 91 Wis. at 187-88, 64
N.W.2d at 865).
101. Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ RL 24.07 (3) (1995). If a broker discovers information that
could have a possible material adverse affect on the transaction, the broker must: (1) disclose
this information, in writing and in a timely manner, to all parties in the transaction; (2) rec-
ommend to the parties that they hire an expert to "inspect or investigate for possible mate-
rial adverse fact to the transaction;" and (3) "draft appropriate inspection or investigation
contingencies" if directed to do so by the parties. Id. However, a broker is not required to
disclose information related to the condition of the property if a "qualified third party" has
conducted an inspection of the property. See WIS. STAT. § 452.23(2)(b) 1995-96; see also
Conell v. CoIdwell Banker Premier Real Estate, Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 894, 900, 512 N.W.2d 239,
242 (Ct. App. 1994).
102. Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
103. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § RL 24.07(1) (1996). A broker, however, is not required to
inspect the property if the broker or a party in the transaction employs a "qualified third
party" to inspect the property. See id. § RL 24.07(5). The broker must obtain a written copy
of the inspection report and deliver a copy of the report, in a timely manner, to all interested
parties. Id
104. IM § RL24.07(2).
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verse conditions."1 s
Although Wisconsin courts have yet to interpret the extent of a bro-
ker's liability for failing to conduct a diligent investigation, some juris-
dictions have imposed liability for failing to disclose information that
the broker should have known through such an investigation.1" In the
leading case of Easton v. Strassburger,7 a California court held that a
real estate broker's failure to investigate potential soil problems after
observing certain warning signs was a breach of the broker's duty to the
buyer."° In Easton, a buyer purchased a home located on a one-acre
parcel of land which suffered massive earth movements shortly after the
buyer took possession."° Due to the severe nature of the earth move-
ments, a portion of the property began to slide away causing significant
damage to the residential structure.Y° Although the sellers never in-
formed the real estate brokers of any prior earth movements or of their
attempts to correct the problem, the court determined that the real es-
tate brokers had sufficient notice of potential soil problems and were
negligent for not conducting a more thorough investigation." '
As indicated by the Easton case, the law has moved in a direction
that presently requires brokers to make a "full disclosure of all material
facts.., whenever elementary fair conduct demands. '1
C. Material Adverse Facts
Wisconsin, like most states, requires sellers" and real estate brokers
105. Id. § RL24.07(3).
106. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1984); Gouveia v. Citicorp
Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr., Inc., 686 P.2d 262 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d
790 (Utah 1986).
107. 199 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
108. Id. at 391-92.
109. Id. at 385.
110. Id. at 391-92.
111. Id. Due to the "red flags" which indicated potential soil problems, the court indi-
cated that the real estate brokers should have requested a soils report, or taken investigatory
measures to determine if there had been prior erosion or soil problems. Id. at 391.
112. See RAUSHENBUSH & MINTER, supra note 58, at § 4.06 (quoting WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS 535 (2d ed. 1955)).
113. In Wisconsin, sellers of property containing one to four dwelling units must com-
plete a real estate condition report (RECR). WIS. STAT. § 709.01 (1995-96). Under the
RECR, a seller must disclose any known defect that affects the property. See id. § 709.03.
For purposes of the RECR, a "defect" is defined as "a condition that would have a signifi-
cant adverse effect on the value of the property; that would significantly impair the health or
safety of future occupants... ; or that if not repaired, removed or replaced would signifi-
cantly shorten or adversely affect the expected normal life of the premises." Id. at §
709.03(B)(1).
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to disclose all material adverse facts concerning a property to prospec-
tive homebuyers. The question of materiality, however, generally de-
pends upon the particular facts of each case. Many courts, therefore,
have struggled to determine what information is considered material to
the transaction. 114 In Ollerman v. O'Rourke,' the Wisconsin Supreme
Court defined a material fact as one that:
[A] reasonable purchaser would attach importance to its exis-
tence or nonexistence in determining the choice of action in the
transaction in question; or if [a broker] knows or has reason to
know that [a] purchaser regards or is likely to regard the matter
as important in determining the choice of action, although a rea-
sonable purchaser would not so regard it. 6
A material fact includes any condition or occurrence that has a signifi-
cant adverse effect on the value of the property or the structural integ-
rity of the improvements, or presents a significant health risk to the oc-
cupants of the property."7
Furthermore, some jurisdictions have interpreted "material adverse
facts" to include information which has no relation to the physical con-
dition of the property. In Stambovsky v. Ackley,"' the New York Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, held that a seller had a duty to dis-
close to a potential buyer that he believed the house to be haunted by
ghosts. "9 Similarly, a California court, in Reed v. King,"2 extended a
broker's disclosure duties by holding that a broker could be liable for
failing to disclose that a murder had occurred in the residence ten years
before the sale of the property, if the buyer could prove that the murder
114. See Paula C. Murray, Aids, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers
Disclose?, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 694 (1992).
115. 94 Wis. 2d 17,288 N.W.2d 95 (1980).
116. Id. at 42, 88 N.W.2d at 107 (quoting 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 538
(1977)). The Wisconsin legislature essentially has codified this definition in Wisconsin Stat-
ute § 452.01(5g), which defines a "material adverse fact" as:
an adverse fact that a party indicates is of such significance, or that is generally rec-
ognized by a competent licensee as being of such significance to a reasonable party,
that it affects or would affect the party's decision to enter into a contract or agree-
ment concerning a transaction or affects or would affect a party's decision about the
terms of such a contract or agreement.
117. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 452.01(le)(a) (1995-96).
118. 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1991).
119. Id. at 677. Because the seller had publicized the existence of the spirits in Reader's
Digest and a local newspaper, the court found that the seller was "estopped to deny [the exis-
tence of the spirits] and, as a matter of law, the house [was] haunted." IL at 674. In addi-
tion, the court found that the broker had no duty to disclose "the phantasmal reputation of
the premises." Id. at 674-75.
120. Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983).
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had a material affect on the property's value."
In Wisconsin, a broker is not required to disclose that "the property
was the site of a specific act or occurrence" unless that act or occurrence
had an effect on the physical condition or structural integrity of the
property.'" As a result, a broker would likely not have to disclose that a
property had been the site of a murder, suicide, haunting, or other noto-
rious event unless the event resulted in physical damage to the property.
Because this law applies only to brokers, a seller arguably would have a
duty to disclose the notorious event if the event could have a significant
adverse affect on the property's value."
In other jurisdictions, sellers and brokers not only have a duty to
disclose conditions attributable to the subject property, but also any off-
site conditions that might reasonably affect the value or enjoyment of
the property for sale. 24 For example, in Strawn v. Canuso,1 5 the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that a seller and broker could be held liable
for failing to disclose the existence of a nearby landfill which posed sig-
nificant health and safety risks to area residents due to possible hazard-
ous waste contamination."2 In making this determination, the Strawn
court reasoned that when an off-site physical condition is known by the
seller or broker and both unknown and material to the buyer, the seller
or broker has a duty to disclose."z However, the Strawn court noted the
sellers and real estate brokers do not "have a duty to investigate or dis-
close transient social conditions in the community that arguably affect
the value of property."' '
In keeping with the trend of consumer protectionism, Wisconsin
courts could extend the definition of "material adverse fact" to include
121. See id. at 133.
122. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 452.23(2)(a) (1995-96).
123. See id. at § 709.03.
124. See e.g., Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), affd 657
A.2d 420 (1995); Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
sellers would be required to disclose neighborhood noise problems and nuisances caused by
neighbors to prospective homebuyers); O'Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 542 A.2d 333
(Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (finding a seller liable for failing to disclose to the buyer that the
property was located too close to a town well to obtain a permit to use the property for the
buyer's intended purpose); Saslow v. Novick, 191 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Super. Ct. 1959) (finding
that a seller of a cigar store had a duty to disclose to the buyer that the New York City Tran-
sit Authority was attempting to eliminate a nearby subway station that served as the primary
source of transportation for many of the store's customers).
125. Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (NJ. 1995).
126. Id. at 431.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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off-site conditions which might reasonably affect the value of the prop-
erty or the health and safety of the occupants. Because the broker's
disclosure duty extends to any conditions that are materially adverse to
the transaction, 29 the broker's duty to disclose off-site material adverse
facts arguably would not be limited to only those conditions which
would affect the value of the property or the health and safety of the
occupants.
III. WISCONSIN'S "MEGAN" LAW
On June 24, 1996, Governor Tommy Thompson signed into law
Wisconsin's Law which upgraded and expanded Wisconsin's existing
sex offender registration requirements.30 Due to the public outrage
surrounding the proliferation of violent sex crimes, especially those
against children, Wisconsin's Law is designed to better protect society
by providing local communities with information about known sex of-
fenders living in their neighborhoods.'' The most important provisions
of Wisconsin's Law include requiring convicted sex offenders to register
with the Department of Corrections (DOC) and requiring the DOC to
disseminate this information to local law enforcement officials and the
general public.'2
A. Registration Requirements for Sex Offenders
The system of registering sex offenders is intended to serve two
primary functions. First, by requiring sex offenders to provide personal
information and the location of their residence, local law enforcement
officials have immediate access to a list of possible suspects whenever a
person is sexually assaulted or reported missing."' Because this infor-
mation is kept in a central registry," allowing communities to share in-
formation, law enforcement agencies can solve crimes more expedi-
tiously. Second, because law enforcement agencies possess this
information, sexual offenders will likely be deterred from committing
129. WIs. ADMIN. CODE § RL 24.07(3) (1996).
130. S.B. 182, 96 Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1996) (effective June 1, 1997).
131. l
132. Prior to the enactment of Wisconsin's Law, the DOC, formerly the Department of
Justice, kept all registration information confidential, except as needed for law enforcement
purposes. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(7)(a) (West Supp. 1997).
133. Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Laws: The Punishment, Liberty,
Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 788,795 (1996).
134. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(2)(a) (West Supp. 1997).
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future sexual offenses. By requiring sex offenders to register, they
will be on notice that when subsequent sex crimes are committed in
their neighborhood, they may be subject to investigation."6
Under Wisconsin's Law, any person convicted of a sexual assault
of an adultm or a sex crime involving a child"' is required to register
with the DOC.'4 All registrants must provide, among other things, a
DNA sample,"4 their name,42 a physical description, 43 the address at
which they will be residing,'T and a description, including the license
plate number, of any motor vehicle they own.'45 This information, along
with the offender's history of sex-related crimes," must be maintained
on the state registry."
After being released from prison, registrants must contact the DOC
and provide it with updated information at least once each calendar
year" and whenever the information changes. 49 All offenders are re-
quired to continue this process for a period of 15 years following their
release.5 However, if the person is a repeat sex offender or is consid-
ered to be a sexually violent person,' the offender must continue to
comply with the registration requirements for the remainder of the per-
son's life.52 If offenders fail to comply with these requirements, they
may be fined up to $10,000, imprisoned up to nine months, or both.'53
135. See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 133, at 796.
136. Id.
137. For purposes of this Comment, a person who has been convicted, adjudicated de-
linquent, or found in need of protection or services on or after December 25, 1993 will be
considered "convicted." See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(1) (West Supp. 1997).
13& See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(1) - (3).
139. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.22(2), 944.06, 948.02(1), 948.02(2), 948.025, 948.05,
948.055, 948.06, 948.07, 948.11, or 948.30, or of §§ 940.30 or 940.31, if the victim was a minor
and the person was not the victim's parent.
140. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(1), (3)(b) (West Supp. 1997).
141. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 165.76(a), (2)(b)(3) (1995-96).
142. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(2)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
143. See id. § 301.45(2)(a)(2).
144. See icL § 301.45(2)(a)(5).
145. See id § 301.45(2)(a)(7).
146. See Ua § 301.45(2)(a)(3).
147. See iUL § 301.45(2)(a).
148. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(3)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
149. Id. at § 301.45(4).
150. Id. § 301.45(5)(a)(2).
151. See id. § 980.01 (7) (1995-96); see also id. 88 940.225(1), 940.225(2), 948.02 (1),
948.02(2), and 948.025 (1995-96).
152. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(5)(b) (West Supp. 1997).
153. Id. § 301.45(6)(a).
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B. Community Notification Requirements
While registration requirements allow law enforcement agencies to
keep track of sex offenders, community notification is intended to pro-
vide residents with information necessary to protect themselves from
sex offenders who live in their proximity."
Wisconsin's Law creates a two-tiered system for the classification
and notification of released sex offenders.5s The levels of community
notification vary based on the perceived risk of danger to the public. If
the sex offender has been convicted or found not guilty on only one oc-
casion, the perceived risk of a repeat offense is low, and the DOC has
the discretion to provide the registration information through a written
bulletin 56 to local law enforcement officials" in the community where
the person is residing, employed, or attending school. 8 If the sex of-
fender has been convicted or found not guilty on two or more occasions
or is considered to be a sexually violent person,"9 the perceived risk is
high, and the DOC is required, rather than having the option, to send a
bulletin to local law enforcement officials.'W
Upon request, the DOC also must provide various community
groups, such as public or private elementary and secondary schools, day
care providers, neighborhood watch programs, and organized units of
the Boy and Girl Scouts of America, with information 6' concerning a
154. See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83
CAL. L. REv. 885, 903 (1995).
155. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 301.46(2m) (West Supp. 1997). If the sex offender has been
convicted or found not guilty on only one occasion, the DOC may notify local law enforce-
ment officials of the sex offender's release into their community if the DOC determines that
such notification is necessary to protect the public. Id. at § 301.46(2m)(a). However, such
notification is mandatory if the sex offender has been convicted or found not guilty on two or
more occasions. Id. § 301.46(2m)(am).
156. See id. § 301.46(2m)(b).
157. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.46(2) (West Supp. 1997). If the DOC determines that noti-
fication is necessary to protect the public, the agency may provide local law enforcement of-
ficials with a written bulletin. Id. § 301.46(2m). For purposes of this Comment, "local law
enforcement officials" will mean the police chief of the community and the sheriff of the
county in which the person will be residing, employed, or attending school. ld. at §
301.46(2)(a).
158. See id. § 301.46(2)(b)(5), (8), (9).
159. See WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7) (1995-96).
160. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.46(2m)(am) (West Supp. 1997).
161. The DOC must provide the following information: (1) the name of the sex of-
fender, including any aliases; (2) the date of the sex offender's conviction, and the county or
state, if not Wisconsin, in which the sex offender was convicted; and (3) the make, model,
and license plate number of any motor vehicle owned by the sex offender or registered in the
sex offender's name. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.46 (4)(ar)(b) (West Supp. 1997). Noticeably
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specific registered sex offender or all registered sex offenders 2 within a
community.
163
After receiving the information from the DOC, local law enforce-
ment officials are permitted to disseminate the registration information
to members of the general public.'6 However, the local law enforce-
ment officials may provide this information only if law enforcement of-
ficials determine that the information is necessary to protect the pub-
lic.' Additionally, local law enforcement officials may provide a sex
offender's registration information to members of the public upon re-
quest, but again, only if the local law enforcement officials determine
that it is necessary to protect the public.1" To be valid, the request
must: (1) be in the proper form and manner, as determined by the local
law enforcement officials; 67 (2) state the name of the specific individual
about whom the person is seeking information;' 6 and (3) contain any
other information the local law enforcement officials consider necessary
to accurately determine whether the person is a registered sex of-
fender. 9 If the person requesting the registration information satisfies
all the requirements set forth by the local law enforcement officials, the
local law enforcement officials must present that person with the sex of-
fender's date of conviction,7 information about any motor vehicle the
sex offender owns,' and the most recent date the registration informa-
tion was updated.'" Unlike the community notification requirements in
absent from this list of information is the address of the sex offender's place of residence.
See id Although not clear from the law's legislative history, one can arguably assume that
this omission was intended to provide the released sex offender with some protection from
angry residents who disapprove of the sex offender's placement in their community.
162. Unlike the two-tiered classification system created for notifying law enforcement
officials, the DOC is authorized to provide information to community groups and citizens on
any registered sex offender, regardless of whether the sex offender is perceived as high risk.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 301.46(4) (West Supp. 1997).
163. Id. § 301.46(4)(a) - (ar).
164. Id. § 301.46(2)(e), (2m)(c), (5)(a).
165. Id. § 301.46(2)(e). In determining whether the release of registration information is
necessary to protect the general public, the police chief or sheriff in possession of such in-
formation is given discretionary authority. Id § 301.46(2m)(c).
166. Id § 301.46(5)(a).
167. WIS. STAT. § 301.46(5)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
168. Id § 301.46(5)(a)(2).
169. Id. § 301.46(5)(a)(3). The local law enforcement officials also may require the
written request to contain a statement indicating why the person is requesting the informa-
tion. Id § 301.46(5)(a).
170. Id. § 301.46(5)(b)(1).
171. Id. § 301.46(5)(b)(2).
172. Wis. STAT. § 301.46(5)(b)(3) (West Supp. 1997). However, the local law enforce-
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other states, 73 Wisconsin's Law does not require the DOC to release in-
formation relating to the sex offender's place of residence.7 4
Wisconsin's Law also provides law enforcement officials with civil
immunity for a good faith act or omission regarding the release of in-
formation.'75 This immunity, however, does not protect a law enforce-
ment official "whose act or omission constitutes gross negligence or in-
volves reckless, wanton or intentional misconduct.' 17 6
IV. ANALYSIS
Wisconsin's Law does not create an affirmative duty for sellers or
real estate brokers to disclose the presence of a known sex offender
living in a neighborhood. However, in view of the fact that the disclo-
sure duties of both sellers and brokers have expanded significantly since
the days of caveat emptor, some commentators have suggested that both
sellers and brokers have a legal duty, rather than a mere "moral obliga-
tion,"'7 to disclose the presence of known sex offenders living in a
neighborhood to prospective homebuyers"' Because neither Wisconsin
courts nor courts in other jurisdictions have had the opportunity to de-
cide whether such a disclosure duty exists, the answer, as illustrated by
the divergent viewpoints of legal experts,'79 is not yet evident.
As indicated by recent incidents in other states,"' it is, however, only
a matter of time before a homebuyer in Wisconsin discovers a sex of-
ment officials are prohibited from providing any information about a child sex offender or
information relating to a juvenile proceeding of an adult sex offender. See id. §
301.46(5)(b)(3)(c)(1), (2).
173. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9798(a)(1) (West 1997); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.24.550(2) (West 1997).
174. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.46(5)(b) (West Supp. 1997).
175. Ild. § 301.46(7).
176. Id.
177. Flavio L. Komuves, For Sale: Two-Bedroom Home With Spacious Kitchen, Walk-In
Closet, And Pervert Next Door, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 668, 697 (1997).
178. See, e.g., id. at 706.
179. See Komuves, supra note 177, at 697 (citing Robert Schwaneberg, Megan's Law
May Force Sellers to Notify Buyers About Sex Offenders, Star Ledger (Newark, NJ), July 22,
1996, at 1, 1996 WL 7950435) presenting the opinion of one real estate attorney, who be-
lieves that the law will soon develop to require sellers, and presumably real estate brokers, to
disclose the existence of known sex offenders. Compare with Schwaneberg, at 1, (expressing
the view of a former judge and lawyer who believes that courts may limit disclosure duties to
"permanent, physical features such as abandoned dumps," and not extend the duty to known
sex offenders).
180. See Karen Hucks, Realtor Wants Sex Offenders To Notify Sellers/Law Sought After
Home In Lacey Unwittingly Sold To Family With Molester, 19, MORNING NEWS TRIB.
(Tacoma, Wash.), at Al, 1998 WL 4077594.
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fender living in the neighborhood after purchasing a home and subse-
quently sues a seller or real estate broker for failing to disclose this in-
formation. In anticipation of such a day, this Comment will now exam-
ine what a homebuyer would likely have to demonstrate under current
Wisconsin law to bring a cause of action against a seller or real estate
broker who failed to disclose the presence of a known sex offender liv-
ing in the neighborhood.
A. A Duty To Disclose
First, a homebuyer would likely have to demonstrate that a seller or
real estate broker has a duty to disclose information. As previously dis-
cussed in this Comment,18' sellers of residential real estate in Wisconsin
must disclose to prospective buyers the existence of any known defects
that would, among other things, (1) "have a significant adverse effect on
the value of the property," or (2) "significantly impair the health or
safety of future occupants of the property."" Similarly, real estate bro-
kers in Wisconsin have a duty to disclose to each party in the transac-
tion any known material adverse facts related to the transaction that
"the party does not know or cannot discover through a reasonably vigi-
lant observation," unless such disclosure is prohibited by law." Al-
though the scope of these duties are defined using different terminology
(i.e., "material adverse fact" versus "defect that would have a significant
adverse effect"), a court would likely determine that both the seller and
broker have an independent duty to disclose to prospective homebuyers
any known on-site or off-site defect that will materially affect the value
of the property or the health and safety of prospective homebuyers.'
Therefore, even if a seller specifically instructs the broker not to inform
prospective homebuyers of a known material defect, the broker has an
independent duty, which overrides the duties of loyalty and confidenti-
ality owed to the seller,'5 to disclose this information to prospective
181. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
182. Wis. STAT. § 709.03 (1995-96).
183. WIs. ADMIN. CODE § RL 24.07(2) (1996). The broker must make this disclosure in
writing and in a timely manner. Id
184. Although a broker is not required to disclose a material adverse fact that the buyer
is already aware of or could discover through a "reasonably vigilant observation," a broker
arguably should disclose this information under these circumstances nonetheless to ensure
that the broker is acting competently. See WIs. ADMIN. CODE § RL 24.07(2), (3) (1996).
185. See Wis. STAT. § 452.133(1)(d), (2)(a) (1995-96). Under this statute, the broker's
duty of confidentiality owed to all parties is subordinate to the broker's duty to disclose all
material adverse facts to all parties. Id § 452.133(1)(d). Similarly, a broker is required to
place the client's interests ahead of the interests of any other party unless it would violate the
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homebuyers.1 6
In addition to having the duty to disclose known material adverse
facts, a broker also must disclose, in writing and in a timely manner, any
information that suggests "the possibility of material adverse facts to
the transaction..'... Therefore, if a broker learned that some condition
was possibly forthcoming and may have a material adverse affect at
some point in the future (i.e., a proposed rock quarry in the immediate
vicinity), the broker is required to disclose this information.'
B. Material Adverse Fact
Next, a buyer would likely have to show that the presence of a
known sex offender is a material adverse fact. In order for an adverse
fact to be material it must be "of such significance... to a reasonable
party that it affects or would affect the party's decision to enter into a
contract... concerning a transaction or... a party's decision about the
terms of such a contract."'89 In other words, the condition must be so
essential to the transaction that had the prospective homebuyer known
the truth, the homebuyer would not have purchased the property or
would not have accepted the terms of the purchase contract. To dem-
onstrate that the presence of a known sex offender living in the area
would constitute a material adverse fact, a prospective homebuyer
would likely have to prove that such information would have a signifi-
cant negative impact on either the value of the property or on the
health or safety of future occupants of the property."l
1. Affect on a Property's Value
Although the exact dollar value is almost impossible to calculate,
the perceived health and safety risk resulting from a known sex of-
fender living in a neighborhood will likely have a significant negative
affect on the value of any property located in that neighborhood. If in-
formed that a sex offender is living in the area, most homebuyers, espe-
duties specifically owed to all parties in the transaction, including the duty to disclose all ma-
terial adverse facts. Id. § 452.133(2)(a).
186. WiS. STAT. § 452.133(1)(c) (1995-96).
187. WIs. ADMIN. CODE § RL 24.07(3) (1996).
188. Although sellers also must disclose information suggesting the possibility of future
defects, this duty is limited to such information as "proposed or pending special assessments"
and "proposed construction of a public project that may affect the use of the property." See
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 709.03(c)(24), (25) (West Supp. 1997).
189. Wis. STAT. § 452.01(5g) (1995-96).
190. See id. § 709.03.
1184 [Vol. 81:1161
TO DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE
cially those with children, would likely decide not to purchase a home in
the nearby vicinity, no matter what the price. Some homebuyers, how-
ever, may still be interested in purchasing a home after learning that a
sex offender is living in the neighborhood, but the price they are willing
to pay would likely be discounted significantly due to the reduced num-
ber of buyers who would be willing to purchase the home upon resale if
the sex offender was still living in the area.1
2. Impact on the Health or Safety of Future Occupants
In addition to significantly affecting a property's value, the presence
of a sex offender living in an area also may have a significant impact on
the health or safety of future occupants of the property. Studies have
shown that child sex offenders, on average, molest 117 children during
their lifetime,1" while other studies indicate that rates of recidivism are
as high as eighty percent. 3 Due to the high rate of recidivism among
sex offenders,"' most homebuyers would likely consider a sex offender
living in a neighborhood to be a significant health or safety risk to area
residents. 5
Whether considering the affect on value or the potential health or
safety risks, a court would likely find the presence of a sex offender liv-
ing in a neighborhood to be a material adverse fact.
C. Misrepresentation As A Matter Of Law
Next, a buyer would likely have to prove that the seller's or real es-
tate broker's failure to disclose constituted a misrepresentation as a
matter of law. Wisconsin courts generally recognize three types of legal
misrepresentation: intentional, negligent, and strict responsibility.'
191. For a discussion on the effect of disclosures on market value, see Komuves, supra
note 177, at 700 n.211.
192. See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 133, at 795 (citing results from a National Institute
study finding that each child -molester abuses an average of 117 children); see also
LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILD VICrIMIZERS: VIOLENT
OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 9 (1996) (reporting that 20% - 30% of prisoners in state
correctional facilities have sexually abused more than one child).
193. See Jennifer M. Bund, Comment, Did You Say Chemical Castration?, 59 U. PITr.
L. REV. 157, 162-63 (1997) (citing Robert E. Freeman-Longo & Ronald V. Wall, Changing a
Lifetime of Sexual Crime; Can Sex Offenders Ever Alter Their Ways? Special Treatment Pro-
grams Provide Some Hope, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. 1986, at 58).
194. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
195. See WIS. STAT. § 452.01(le)(a)(3) (1995-96).
196. See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text. See also Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis.
2d 166,169-70,168 N.W.2d 201,203-04 (1969); Wis. J I-Civil 2400-03.
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Each type of misrepresentation has three common elements: (1) the de-
fendant made a factual representation; (2) the factual representation
was untrue; and (3) the plaintiff believed the factual representation to
be true and relied on it to his or her detriment." In addition, if a party
has a duty to disclose a fact but fails to do so, the party's "failure to dis-
close that fact is treated in the law as equivalent to a representation of
the nonexistence of the fact."'98 Because the presence of a known sex
offender living in a neighborhood would likely a constitute a material
adverse fact which both sellers and real estate brokers have- a duty to
disclose, a failure to disclose this information would be treated as repre-
sentation that the fact did not exist. The first two elements of misrepre-
sentation would be satisfied, leaving a court to consider whether the
homebuyer believed the factual representation to be true and relied on
it to his or her detriment. Similarly, the determination that information
constitutes a material adverse fact' necessarily presumes that the
homebuyer believed the factual representation to be true and relied on
it to his or her detriment.m As a result, a court also would likely find
the third element to be satisfied.
1. Intentional Misrepresentation
In addition to the three common elements of misrepresentation, a
buyer making an intentional misrepresentation claim must demonstrate
that the seller or real estate broker: (1) "either made the representation
knowing it was untrue or made it recklessly without caring whether it
was true or untrue;"' ' and (2) made the representation to intentionally
deceive and induce the buyer to act upon it.0 Because a seller or real
estate broker who fails to inform a prospective homebuyer of a known
sex offender living in the neighborhood presumably does so in order to
induce the prospective homebuyer into purchasing the house, a buyer
would likely succeed in an intentional misrepresentation claim.
2. Strict Responsibility
A prospective homebuyer also may file a strict responsibility claim
197. See Whipp, 43 Wis. 2d at 169, 168 N.W.2d at 203.
198. Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17,26,288 N.W.2d 95, 100 (1980). This rule
applies to all three forms of misrepresentation. See also Wis. J I-Civil 2402-03.
199. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
201. Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 54, 496 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Lundin v. Shimanksi, 124 Wis. 2d 175, 184,368 N.W.2d 676,680 (1985)).
202. See Lundin, 124 Wis. 2d at 184,368 N.W.2d at 680. See also, Wis. J I-Civil 2401.
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for misrepresentation. In making a strict responsibility claim for mis-
representation, the buyer must demonstrate, in addition to the three
common elements, that the seller or real estate broker: (1) made the
representation based on his or her own personal knowledge, or could
have ascertained the pertinent facts, his or her "position made possible
complete knowledge and his or her statements fairly implied that he or
she had [the knowledge];"' and (2) had an economic interest in the
transaction. Because the seller or real estate broker, under this hypo-
thetical scenario, knew that a sex offender was living in the area and
both have an economic interest in the transaction,25 a buyer would
likely have a successful strict liability claim for misrepresentation.
3. Negligent Misrepresentation
If the buyer makes a claim of negligent misrepresentation, the buyer
must prove one element in addition to the three common elements of
misrepresentation: that the seller or real estate broker "was negligent in
making the representation.""" A seller or real estate broker is negligent
if he or she "makes a representation under circumstances in which a
person of ordinary intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to fore-
see that such representation will subject the interest of another to an
unreasonable risk of damage." Accordingly, if the seller or real estate
broker demonstrated "a lack of reasonable care" in obtaining informa-
tion related to the sex offender or made the disclosure "without the skill
or competence required" in the real estate industry,2 the buyer will
likely have a successful negligent misrepresentation claim.
D. Award of Damages
If a buyer is able to show that the presence of a known sex offender
is a material adverse fact and that the seller and/or real estate broker
203. See Wis. J I-Civil 2402 (citing Fowler V. Harper and Mary Coate McNeely, A
Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation, 22 MINN. L. REv. 939, 987-88 (1938). See also
Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d at 55, 496 N.W.2d at 115 (citing Gauerke v. Rozga, 112 Wis. 2d
271,280,332 N.W.2d 804,809 (1983)).
204. See Wis. J I-Civil 2402.
205. A seller has an economic interest in selling the house and the real estate broker has
an economic interest in receiving a commission upon procuring a ready willing and able pur-
chaser. See generally RAUSHENBUSH & MINTER, supra note 58, § 3.03(F) (discussing how a
broker earns a commission).
206. See Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 153 Wis. 2d 589, 593 n.2, 451
N.W.2d 456,459 (Ct. App. 1989).
207. See Wis.J I--Civil 2403.
208. Id.
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had a duty to disclose this information, but failed to do so, a court
would likely rescind the contract,' award compensatory damages in an
amount equal to the difference between the purchase price and the
home's fair market value,2 10 and/or award punitive damages21' to punish
the seller or real estate broker for the nondisclosure.
E. Other Considerations
1. The Means by which the Seller or Broker Learned of the
Information
In addition, a court may also consider how the seller or real estate
broker learned of the information relating to the location of the known
sex offender (i.e., the reliability of the information). If the seller or real
estate broker learned of the information through the notification proc-
ess specifically provided for under Wisconsin's Law, a seller or broker
could be relatively certain that the information was reliable, at least at
the time the local law enforcement officials disseminated the informa-
tion. Accordingly, a court may be more likely to require disclosure un-
der these circumstances. On the other hand, if the seller learned of the
information through word of mouth without any confirmation from law
enforcement officials, the information would not be as reliable and,
therefore, may not necessitate disclosure. Because a broker, unlike a
seller, has a duty to disclose any information suggesting the possibility
of a material adverse fact, a broker arguably would still be required to
make a disclosure even though the broker did not learn of the informa-
tion through the notification process under Wisconsin's Law.
2. Interpretation by the Department of Regulation and Licensing
Because the Wisconsin legislature has given the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Regulation and Licensing ("DRL') the authority to promul-
gate rules relating to the ethical conduct of brokers, including disclo-
sure duties, a court may also consider an interpretation made by the
209. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Notte, 97 Wis. 2d 207, 219, 221, 293 N.W.2d
530, 536-37 (1980). See also Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 171, 168 N.W.2d 201, 204
(1969) (noting that claims for rescission are discernable from claims seeking damages for
misrepresentation).
210. See Wis. J I-Civil 2405,2405.5, and 2406.
211. See Owens v. Meyer Sales Company, Inc., 129 Wis. 2d 491, 494-95, 385 N.W.2d
234,236 (Ct. App. 1986).
212 See Wis. ADMIN. CODE § RL 24.07(3) (1996).
213. See WiS. STAT. § 452.07(1) (1995-96).
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DRL. In an opinion letter from the DRL, attorney Donald R. Rittel
maintained that a real estate broker does not have a duty to disclose the
presence of a known sex offender unless: (1) the broker learned of the
information through the community notification process created by
Wisconsin's Law, and (2) the prospective buyer specifically asked the
broker about such information.214
When reviewing an administrative agency's conclusions of law, a
court will apply one of three standards of deference: great weight def-
erence, due weight deference, or de novo review.2 The level of defer-
ence "depends on the comparative institutional capabilities and qualifi-
cation of the court and the administrative agency."216  An agency's
conclusion of law is entitled to great weight deference only when all of
the following requirements have been met:
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the duty of
administering the statute; (2) that the interpretation of the
agency is one of longstanding; (3) that the agency employed its
expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation;
and (4) that the agency's interpretation will provide uniformity
and consistency in the application of the statute.2 7
Depending upon when a court is presented with this issue, the
DRL's interpretation may or may not be a longstanding interpretation.
However, the dispositive issue would likely be whether the DRL has
sufficient "expertise or specialized knowledge" to make this determina-
tion. Although the DRL has the "expertise or specialized knowledge"
to determine what constitutes a material adverse fact for purposes of
determining a real estate broker's disclosure duties,2 8 it has not been
given the authority, nor does it have the expertise, to interpret Wiscon-
sin's Law. Rather, the Wisconsin legislature arguably has given the
DOC the specific authority to interpret and administer Wisconsin's
Law. 29 As a result, a court likely would not give great weight deference
214. Letter from Attorney Donald R. Rittel, Wisconsin Department of Regulation and
Licensing, to Richard Staff, General Counsel, Wisconsin Realtors Association (Sept. 16,
1996) (on file with author).
215. UFE Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 201 Wis. 2d 274,284,548 N.W.2d 57,
61 (1996).
216. State ex rel. Parker v. Sullivan, 184 Wis. 2d 668,699,517 N.W.2d 449,461 (1994).
217. UFE Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 201 Wis. 2d at 284,548 N.W.2d at 61
(quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650,660,539 N.W.2d 98,102 (1995)).
218. In his letter, Rittel recognizes that the presence of known sex offender living in a
neighborhood would likely constitute a material adverse fact to prospective homebuyers. See
supra note 214.
219. See WIS. STAT. §§ 301.01(1), 301.45(8) (1995-96).
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to the DRL's legal conclusion.
A court will give an agency's legal conclusion due weight deference
"when the agency has some experience in an area, but has not devel-
oped the expertise which necessarily places it in a better position to
make judgments regarding the interpretation of the statute than a
court." m  Again, because the DRL has little, if any, expertise in inter-
preting Wisconsin's Law, a court likely would not give due weight def-
erence to the DRL's legal conclusion.
The third level of deference is no deference, or de novo review. A
court will make a de novo review of an agency's conclusion of law if any
of the following are true: "(1) the issue before the agency is clearly one
of first impression; (2) a legal question is presented and there is no evi-
dence of any special agency expertise or experience; or (3) the agency's
position on an issue has been so inconsistent that it provides no real
guidance."' ' Because the DRL presumably does not have any special
expertise or experience in interpreting Wisconsin's Law, a court would
not defer to the DRL's conclusion of law. As a result, a court would
likely make a de novo review of such a case.
3. Continuing Education Requirements
Although a court may not pay deference to the DRL's interpreta-
tion, Wisconsin real estate brokers who have relied upon this interpre-
tation would likely have an affirmative defense to a misrepresentation
claim by a homebuyer. As stated previously, in Wisconsin a "material
adverse fact" is defined as "an adverse fact that a party indicates is of
such significance, or that is generally recognized by a competent licensee
as being of such significance to a reasonable party, that it affects or
would affect the party's decision to enter into a contract.., or... the
party's decision about the terms of such a contract .... ,m To help en-
sure that real estate brokers remain competent and informed of current
laws, public policies, and market conditions,' all real estate brokers li-
censed in Wisconsin must satisfy specified continuing education re-
quirements each licensing biennium in order to renew their licenses.'
220. UFE Inc. V. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 201 Wis. 2d at 286, 548 N.W.2d at
62.
221. Coutts v. Wisconsin Retirement Bd., 209 Wis. 2d 655, 664, 562 N.W.2d 917, 921
(1997) (footnotes omitted).
222. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § RL. 24.02(1)(b)(12) (1996) (emphasis added).
223. Id § RL. 24.03(2)(c).
224. d § RL 25.065.
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As part of this mandatory continuing education program, the DRL,2 in
1996, specifically approved continuing education curricula based upon
its interpretation of Wisconsin's Law (i.e., that real estate brokers do
not have a duty to disclose the presence of known sex offenders living in
a neighborhood unless specifically asked).
Because real estate brokers are required to satisfy the continuing
education requirements created by the DRL, a real estate broker who
relies upon and acts in accordance with DRL-approved curricula would
presumably be acting competently. In light of this continuing education
requirement, a court may find that such a broker is not liable for mis-
representation.'
4. Fair Housing Laws
In determining whether to impose a duty to disclose, a court may
also consider whether a sex offender could be classified as a person with
a disability. In Wisconsin, a real estate broker is prohibited from dis-
closing information that would constitute an unlawful discrimination to
any person involved in a transaction. Under Wisconsin's fair housing
laws, a person is prohibited from discriminating against another person
on the basis of that person's disability.m A "disability" is defined as "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities, a record of having such an impairment or being re-
garded as having such an impairment."gAlthough the rehabilitation of
criminals is generally one of the underlying premises of our criminal
justice system, Wisconsin's Law, like other community notification
laws, rejects this premise on the belief that most sex offenders are not
rehabilitated when released from prison.' Due to the high rate of re-
cidivism among sex offenders, some experts believe that various sex of-
fenders have a "pathological need" to repeatedly commit sex crimes
225. As one of its many duties and responsibilities, the Department of Regulation and
Licensing is in charge of approving continuing education programs and courses required for
license renewal. See WIS. STAT. § 452.05 (1)(d), (g) (1995-96).
226. However, if a broker has never attended this course and, therefore, has not relied
upon this information, the broker may not be entitled to this defense.
227. See WIS. STAT. § 452.23(1) (1995-96). Although no statute specifically speaks to
the seller's duty not disclose, such a disclosure, if made by the seller, would arguably violate
the fair housing laws.
228. Id. § 101.22(1).
229. Id. § 101.22(lm)(g).
230. See Bedarf, supra note 154, at 910.
231. Id.
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and, thus, may be mentally disabled.~ This theory of mental disability
is further evidenced by the fact that law enforcement officials often
place released sex offenders in mental health facilities after they have
completed their prison sentencesf 3 Accordingly, if a court determines
that a particular sex offender has a mental disability, a broker would
likely be prohibited from disclosing the presence of a known sex of-
fender to a prospective homebuyer.
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although the presence of a known sex offender living in a neighbor-
hood would likely constitute a material adverse fact which generally
must be disclosed by both sellers and real estate brokers, the public
policy arguments both in favor and against such a disclosure should be
examined before an affirmative disclosure duty is imposed.
A. Public Policy Considerations In Favor of a Duty to Disclose
1. Sellers and Brokers are in the Best Position to Know of Information
As with other disclosure duties relating to material adverse facts, the
primary justification for imposing a disclosure duty on sellers and real
estate brokers under Wisconsin's Law is that they are in a better posi-
tion than prospective homebuyers to know of information that may af-
fect the property. Wisconsin's Law authorizes local law enforcement
officials to make limited disclosures of registration information only if
they determine that it is necessary to protect the public.2M Although
this information will likely spread throughout a community once pro-
vided to one of its residents, many prospective homebuyers, especially
those prospective homebuyers who currently live in different geo-
232. See Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender Commitments: Debunking The Official Narrative
and Revealing the Rules-In-Use, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 71,78 (1997).
233. See Law At A Glance, WIS. ST. J., at 3A, Jan. 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL
5860092; Ed Housewright, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Committing Sex Offenders Under De-
bates - Panel to Consider Forced Hospitalization After Jail, Feb. 11, 1998, available in 1998
WL 2511390 (indicating that various states, including Wisconsin, send some released sex of-
fenders to mental health facilities after completing their prison terms).
234. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. Local law enforcement officials often
choose to disseminate this information through flyers and the local media to residents who
live in the same neighborhood as the released sex offender. See e.g., Brenda Ingersoll, An-
other 'High Risk' Sex Offender Will Live In Madison, WiS. ST. J., Feb. 20, 1998, at 1C, avail-
able in 1998 WL 5862341 (indicating that Wisconsin's Law permits local law enforcement
officials to "organize community meetings and disseminate flyers" when a 'high risk' sex of-
fender is released from prison).
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graphic areas, generally will not have access to this information. In ad-
dition, even if these prospective homebuyers requested information on
known sex offenders living in a particular neighborhood from local law
enforcement officials, the prospective homebuyers may not receive such
information unless they inquired about a specific individual. 5 Fur-
thermore, even if a prospective homebuyer requests information from
local law enforcement officials about a specific sex offender, local law
enforcement officials ultimately decide whether to disseminate the in-
formation.n6 Therefore, unless the seller or broker discloses informa-
tion relating to known sex offenders living in a neighborhood, a pro-
spective homebuyer would likely never become aware of this
information.
The argument in favor of disclosure becomes even more persuasive
when considering the ability of prospective homebuyers to protect
themselves from other latent defects which the real estate broker and
seller must disclose. In most cases, a prospective homebuyer can hire
an independent home inspector or purchase a home warranty to reduce
the risk of possible undisclosed on-site defects. In addition, a prospec-
tive homebuyer can generally drive around the neighborhood or call lo-
cal government officials to discover most adverse conditions located off-
site. Although a prospective homebuyer can discover these adverse
conditions through his or her independent efforts, both a seller and a
real estate broker are required to disclose this information if known by
the seller or real estate broker and is material to the transaction.' Be-
cause a prospective homebuyer is generally unable to identify a sex of-
fender by driving around the neighborhood, and because home warran-
ties do not cover the presence of sex offenders in a neighborhood, a
prospective homebuyer who wants to learn of known sex offenders liv-
ing in a neighborhood is even more dependent upon disclosures by sell-
ers and real estate brokers than he or she is for other material adverse
facts.
2. Wisconsin's Law is Intended to Provide Protection for Area
Residents
One of the primary purposes of Wisconsin's Law is to provide com-
munity residents with information so that they are better able to protect
235. See WIs. STAT. § 301.46(5)(a)(2) (1995-96).
236. See Id. § 301.46(5)(a).
237. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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themselves from sex offenders."8 If community residents are aware of a
sex offender living in their neighborhood, they will have the opportu-
nity to take proactive measures to help reduce the risk of victimization
by known sex offenders. As one commentator stated, "[community no-
tification empowers] individuals [to] police their own communities to
prevent sex crimes, rather than simply react to crimes after they have
been committed."' 9 Therefore, it seems consistent with this rationale to
provide prospective homebuyers with this information to ensure that
prospective homebuyers are given the same opportunity as current resi-
dents to protect themselves.'l
B. Public Policy Considerations Against A Duty to Disclose
In spite of the sound policy arguments in favor of requiring disclo-
sure by sellers and real estate brokers, there exists equally strong policy
arguments against such disclosure requirements.
1. The Disclosure Duties Under Wisconsin's Law are Very Limited in
Scope
Under Wisconsin's Law, the duty to disseminate a sex offender's
registration information to the general public is specifically limited to
local law enforcement officials. 4' To strike a balance between increased
public protection and the need to successfully integrate the sex offender
within the community,22 the Wisconsin legislature created a series of
procedural safeguards243 to limit the free flow of registration informa-
tion to the general public. One of the primary safeguards is the re-
quirement that prior to the dissemination of registration information to
the public local law enforcement officials must determine that the dis-
238. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. See also G. Scott Rafshoon, Comment,
Community Notification of Sex Offenders: Issues of Punishment, Privacy, and Due Process, 44
EMORY L.J. 1633, 1666-67 (1995) (citing "better law enforcement" and "deterrence" as addi-
tional purposes of Megan's Law).
239. Bedarf, supra note 154, at 903.
240. In some areas of the country, local residents have begun to take a proactive ap-
proach to notifying prospective homebuyers of known sex offenders in the neighborhood by
waiting outside a home and informing the prospective homebuyers when they come to tour a
property. See Maryann Haggerty, Selling the Dark Sites of Executioners' Songs; Long After
the Blood of Grisly Crime Scenes Has Turned Cold, Agents Find Buyer Resistance, Reduced
Prices for Stigmatized Homes, WASH. POST, at E01,April 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10012111.
241. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
242. WIs. DEP'T. OF CORRECrIONS, "Sex Offender Community Notification Proposed
Program Components," at 2, Dec. 15, 1994.
243. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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semination of this information is necessary to protect the public.2 " One
can reasonably presume that this duty was assigned to law enforcement
agencies and not, for example, the Department of Transportation, be-
cause law enforcement officials are more experienced in utilizing infor-
mation for criminal investigation purposes without infringing upon the
constitutional rights afforded to criminals.' Therefore, any duty that
would specifically require sellers and real estate brokers to disclose in-
formation regarding known sex offenders to members of the public
would appear to be in direct conflict with the procedural safeguards
specifically created by the legislature to control the dissemination of in-
formation to the public.'
2. Determining the "Zone of Danger"
If required to disclose the existence of known sex offenders to pro-
spective homebuyers, sellers, and real estate brokers would have ex-
treme difficulty in determining the geographical limitations on such a
duty-"the zone of danger." Unlike most other material adverse facts,
a sex offender is mobile and, therefore, not permanently fixed in any
one location. Because of this mobility, a sex offender who lives in one
neighborhood could effectively drive to another neighborhood where
his or her identity is unknown, and commit sex crimes. As a result, it
would be seemingly impossible for a seller or a real estate broker to de-
termine, without some specified guidelines, the distance away a home
must be before a sex offender no longer poses a threat to future occu-
pants. For example, if a sex offender was known to live in a particular
neighborhood, how far away would a property have to be before the
released sex offender no longer posed a reasonable threat to the occu-
pants? Across the street? One block? One mile? Ten miles? Because
any specified distance would be arbitrary and likely unprotective, sellers
and real estate brokers who knew of a sex offender living in any neigh-
borhood arguably would have to make disclosures to all prospective
homebuyers, without considering the distance between the house and
the known sex offender.
244. WIs. STAT. § 301.46(5)(a) (1995-96).
245. See generally Simeon Schopf, "Megan's Law". Community Notification and the
Constitution, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117 (1995) (discussing the effects of community
notification on the constitutional rights of sex offenders).
246. See supra note 242 at ii (recommending that only limited information be provided
to the public upon written request).
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3. No Procedure for Updating or Verifying Registration Information.
Although cases such as Strawn v. Canuso 7 establish an affirmative
duty to disclose off-site conditions such as a nearby landfill, the pres-
ence of sex offender is not of the same category. Unlike a landfill, the
presence of a sex offender is not a permanent adverse condition. Sex
offenders are able to relocate on a recurrent basis. Because a sex of-
fender is mobile, a seller or real estate broker would be required to con-
stantly confirm the sex offender's neighborhood presence to ensure that
any disclosures relating to the sex offender were accurate. To make ac-
curate disclosures to potential buyers, a seller or broker, therefore,
would need to have access to up-to-date information relating to a sex
offender's whereabouts. However, under Wisconsin's Law, any dis-
semination of registration information is subject to the discretion of lo-
cal law enforcement officials.m Furthermore, because local law en-
forcement officials are not required to disclose the address of the sex
offender's residence,249 any information provided by local law enforce-
ment officials would likely be ineffective in helping the seller or broker
to determine if the sex offender was presently living in the same neigh-
borhood.
Another problem facing sellers and real estate brokers is the inabil-
ity to verify the accuracy of the information. Because Wisconsin's Law
provides only limited access to registration information,m a seller or
broker who learns that a sex offender is living in the neighborhood
through a source other than local law enforcement officials may be un-
able to verify that the information is correct. Even the accuracy of in-
formation disseminated under Wisconsin's Law is questionable in view
of the fact that after a sex offender registers with the DOC ' there is no
verification procedure currently in place to determine if the address
given by the released sex offender is accurate. Because the immunity
from civil liability provided for under Wisconsin's Law arguably does
247. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. See Paul Norton, Residents Told of
Molester Safety Vowed; Many Fearful, THE CAP. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1998, at 2A, available in
1998 WL 5863004 (indicating that area residents are often upset when law enforcement offi-
cials refuse to reveal the address of the released sex offender); Law May Spur Vigilantes,
CHI. TRIB., July 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2691930 (citing the threat of vigilantism as
the reason a sex offender's address is not revealed to the general public).
250. See supra note 170-72 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 140.
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not extend to sellers and real estate brokers, 2 a seller or real estate
broker who discloses inaccurate information may be liable for misrepre-
sentation.
4. Impact on Local Real Estate Markets.
Furthermore, by requiring real estate brokers to disclose the pres-
ence of known sex offenders living in an area to all prospective home-
buyers, local housing markets may be severely impacted.23 Prospective
homebuyers, who are informed of a prior sex offender living within a
neighborhood, likely will lose interest in purchasing property within
that neighborhood due to the perceived safety risks. If there is a lack of
buyer demand, area real estate values will sharply decline. As a result,
local residents, unwilling to allow sex offenders to live in their neigh-
borhoods, may result to vigilantism to ostracize sex offenders from their
communities.'M
252. See Wis. STAT. § 301.46(7) (1995-96).
253. See Maryann Haggerty, Selling the Dark Sites of Executioners' Songs; Long After
the Blood of Grisly Crime Scenes Has Turned Col, Agents Find Buyer Resistance, Reduced
Prices for Stigmatized Homes, WASH. POST, April 12, 1997, at E01, available in 1997 WL
10012111 (indicating that stigmatized property often takes years to sell and is often sold at
prices much lower than fair market value); Christopher Combs, Notification Required if Sex
Offender Moves to Neighborhood, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 3, 1996, at EV7, available in 1996
WL 7727667 (stating that community notifications under Megan's Law may significantly im-
pact the property values of neighboring homes and even entire subdivisions); James Ahearn,
When Your Prospective Neighbor Is a Sex Offender, RECORD, Northern New Jersey, July 24,
1996, available in 1996 WL 6100176 (noting that the presence of a sex offender living nearby
will cause parents with children to look elsewhere); Kathy Lynn Gray, New Law Presents
Dilemma For Home Sellers[:] Buyers Do Not Have To Be Told If Sexual Predator Lives In
The Neighborhood, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 20, 1997, at 11J, available in 1997 WL
12512684 (estimating that area real estate values would fall 20 to 50 percent if a sex offender
moved into a neighborhood).
254. See Jon Nordheimer, 'Vigilante' Attack in New Jersey Is Linked to Sex-Offenders
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL 2156821 (reporting that two
men broke into the house where a released sex offender was living and assaulted him); John
T. McQuiston, Sex Offender Is Suing His Neighbors Over Protests, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
1997, at B1, available in 1997 WL 17843673 (describing large rallies held to protest the pres-
ence of sex offender in the community, an incident in which a brick was thrown through the
sex offender's car window, and harassing calls to the sex offender's employer); Michael
O'Keeffe, Sex Offender Alert Raises Concerns, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 6, 1996, at 4A,
available in 1996 WL 12350013(indicating that some community residents believe that com-
munity notification through fliers may lower property values and lead to attacks on sex of-
fenders by residents); Sex Offender Notification" Unintended Consequences, ARIZ. RE-
PUBLIC, Sept. 27, 1996, at B6, available in 1996 WL 7741523; James Ahearn, When Your
Prospective Neighbor Is a Sex Offender, THE RECORD (Northern, NJ.), July 24, 1996, at N7,
available in 1996 WL 6100176 (noting that the impact of community notification on home
values "will give people looking to sell their homes even more reason to wish that the sex
offender down the street would leave the neighborhood ... [and cause some homeowners to]
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VI. RECOMMENDATION: A "BALANCED AND PRACTICAL" SOLUTION
Many states have already addressed this issue by passing legislation
which clearly defines the disclosure duties owed by a seller and broker
under the state's version of Megan's Law. However, a survey of this
legislation indicates that each state has a different approach. In New
Jersey, for example, sellers and real estate brokers are required to dis-
close this information to prospective homebuyers, but only after the
sale closes and only if the sex offender is considered "high risk." 55
Some states, like Minnesota, create a blanket exception for real estate
brokers by specifically exempting them from any disclose duties arising
under Megan's Law.26 Other states, like Washington, are considering
legislation that would require real estate brokers to inform sellers if
their buyer-clients are registered sex offenders.2
Rather than creating a blanket exception for sellers and real estate
brokers or an impractical duty to disclose any known information, Wis-
consin should adopt a 'balanced and practical' solution to the disclosure
issues that arise under Wisconsin's Law.28 One such solution, which is
currently being considered in Virginia and California, would be to re-
quire sellers and real estate brokers to provide prospective homebuyers
with notice on how to obtain information on sex offenders.2" To pro-
vide buyers with this notice, a disclosure statement which informs pro-
spective buyers of their right to contact local law enforcement officials
and inquire whether any sex offenders live in the area could be inserted
into all residential offers to purchase. In exchange for providing pro-
spective homebuyers with this notice, sellers and real estate brokers
would not be required to make any additional disclosures regarding
rationalize vigilantism as regrettably necessary, something the offender brought on him-
self").
255. Mike Kelly, The Real World Dilemma of Megan's Law in N.J., The RECORD,
Northern New Jersey, Jan. 8, 1998, at A03, available in 1998 WL 5791245.
256. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052(Subd. 8) (1996-97). See also. Betsy Z. Russell,
Measure May Haunt Homeowners For Years To Come Senate Oks Bill That Shields Sellers
From Revealing Whether Home Is 'Psychologically Impacted,' The Spokesman Rev.
(Spokane, Wash.), March 5, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 7522919 (indicating that Idaho
has recently introduced legislation (S.B. 1393) that exempts both sellers and real estate bro-
kers from being required to disclose to prospective homebuyers information relating to re-
leased sex offenders); Virginia Churn Times, Liability of Bill Concerns Realtors 1998 Assem-
bly Expected To Debate Virginia Version of Megan's Law, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan.
11, 1998, at K1, available in 1998 WL 2023444.
257. See Hucks, supra note 180.
25& See Times, supra note 256; S.B. 1989, 1997-98 Leg., 2d Sess. Cal. 1998.
259. Id.
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registered sex offenders. °
By directing prospective homebuyers to local law enforcement offi-
cials, prospective homebuyers would be able to receive "uniform and
consistent access" to the most accurate and current information avail-
able on the whereabouts of a released sex offender26 In addition, sell-
ers and real estate brokers would be provided with a relieved of the im-
possible task of determining whether the sex offender poses a sufficient
threat to warrant disclosure. Furthermore, this approach would be con-
sistent with Wisconsin's Law which specifically authorizes the DOC and
local law enforcement officials, rather than sellers and real estate bro-
kers, to be the disseminators of this information.
However, until either a Wisconsin court or the Wisconsin legislature
specifically addresses the disclosure duties of sellers and real estate
brokers under Wisconsin's Law, sellers and real estate brokers will con-
tinue to ponder whether they have a duty to disclose information relat-
ing to known sex offenders to prospective homebuyers.
THOMAS D. LARSON*
260. See S.B. 1989, supra note 258. California's law would also grant sellers and real es-
tate brokers immunity from any civil suit brought by a registered sex offender relating to the
disclosure. Id.
261. See id
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